Research

Peer-Reviewed Publications

Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem’s Use of Soft Diplomacy & Public Relations: Transformation from Emirate to State. 2024. Nations and Nationalism. 31(1), 223–244. (with Hasan Johar, Ali Dashti, Hamed Al-Abdullah, and Ali Al-Kandari)

Working Papers

U.S. Foreign Policy and Arab Israeli Relations: A Quantitative Approach. Revise and Resubmit at International Studies Quarterly

Abstract

Why did some Arab states sign and maintain normalization agreements with Israel while others did not? Prior research focuses more on rivalry termination as indicator of rapprochement, yet it is unclear why rapprochement endures and recurs after failure despite high commitment problems. In this article, I examine the foreign policy conditions under which Arab Israeli rapprochement is likely to occur, succeeds, and recurs. Focusing on US mediation, I propose and test different mechanisms linking US diplomatic visits to Arab Israeli rapprochement. US leaders share private information via face-to-face diplomacy to persuade or subsidize the normalization concession, akin to ‘information lobbying’. Diplomatic visits thus have bigger impact on Arab Israeli rapprochement when the recipient is ex ante less diplomatically embedded with the US. Using data on US diplomatic visits for the sample of MENA countries from 1950 to 2022, I find support to the theoretical prediction: exchanged visits between US and Arab leaders increase the likelihood of normalization onset and success. US Presidential visits have bigger impact on normalization onset when alternative channels of diplomatic communication are weak or have been disrupted. These findings highlight the role of in-person diplomacy situated within the broader diplomatic environment in shaping interstate peace processes.

When Do Visits Lead to Concessions? Alliedness and Host-State Responses to U.S. Presidential Visits. (with James Kim and Chamseul Yu) [Manuscript] Under Review

Abstract

When do U.S. presidential visits generate policy concessions from host states? Prior research has primarily focused on the downstream political consequences of high-level visits yet relatively less attention is given to the conditions under which host states reciprocate visits with concessions. We argue that the effectiveness of diplomatic visits in eliciting host-state concessions is conditional on the level of alliedness between the United States and the host state. Weakly aligned host states have stronger incentives to reciprocate because U.S. diplomatic attention is rarer and carries greater marginal value. This increases both host leaders’ willingness to give something meaningful in return and their political opportunity to justify concessions to domestic audiences. Moving beyond formal defense pacts, we introduce a novel measure of interstate alliedness using a Bayesian latent measurement approach. Using data on U.S. presidential visits from 1977 to 2020 and a panel matching with difference-in-differences (DID) design, we find empirical support for our theoretical prediction. Across economic, diplomatic, and security domains, U.S. presidential visits consistently generate greater policy concessions among weakly aligned host states than among closely aligned ones. Our findings suggest that the existing status of the bilateral relationship is an important factor in determining whether diplomatic visits generate policy returns.

Side Taking in Conflicts: The Case of the Palestine Question

Abstract

When and Why do third-party states take sides in protracted conflicts? Research on partisan interventions has largely focused on ties between third parties and conflict actors, but pays less attention to how domestic politics and great-power dependence jointly shape diplomatic support. I argue that leaders’ ideological preferences drive support for parties involved in protracted conflicts. However, the ideology induced effect is conditional on the degree to which third parties are vulnerable to great powers pressure. I test the argument on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, focusing on UN General Assembly voting records on the Question of Palestine from 1947 to 2020. Leveraging (quasi) exogenous reversals in the ideology of the chief executives across UN member states and using a panel matching with difference-in-differences design, I show that shifts to left leadership decrease vote alignment with Israel, while reversals from left to non-left leadership increase vote alignment with Israel. Yet the ideology induced effect is muted among states that are highly dependent on US economic support, particularly in the post-Cold War era. I also show that left leaders are generally less likely to abstain on Palestine-related resolutions, but economically dependent left governments increasingly turn to abstention in the long run as a strategy to reconcile competing domestic and international incentives. The findings speaks to broad literatures on side taking in conflicts and the domestic politics of foreign policy, by highlighting the role and limits of domestic ideological preferences and hierarchical relations with major powers in shaping when, why, and how third parties express diplomatic support in protracted conflicts.

Work in Progress

The Question of Palestine in the UN General Debate

Law in Speech, Law in Practice? Regime Type and Leaders’ References to UN Resolutions

Oil Supply Shocks, Inflation, and Economic Diplomacy